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INTRODUCTION
When describing things that do not mix well with one another, people 
often analogize to “oil and vinegar.”1 However, the problem with this
Copyright 2020, by KATELYN E. BAYHI.
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560 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
analogy is that oil and vinegar can in fact mix with each other, even if only 
temporarily.2 To truly refer to things that are unable or unwilling to mix
together easily or readily, a person should say those things are “like oil and 
water”3—a reality that Louisiana oil and gas companies know all too well
to be true.
In September 2018, the United States became the world’s largest 
producer of crude oil for the first time since 1973.4 With the expectation
that U.S. crude oil production will continue to exceed that of Russia and
Saudi Arabia throughout 2019,5 this was not only a great achievement, but
also a “historic milestone” for the U.S. oil industry.6 While the nation 
enjoys the benefits of this recent increase, the same cannot be said of the
oil industry in Louisiana. Despite producing almost 1.6 million barrels a
day, and accounting for a little less than one-tenth of the nation’s natural
gas production as recently as October 2017,7 Gifford Briggs, President of 
1. Rebecca L. Miller, Oil and Vinegar, Not Oil and Water, REWRITE,




3. Be Like Oil and Water, FARLAX DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS, https://idioms
.thefreedictionary.com/be+like+oil+and+water [https://perma.cc/3RVF-RGAF]
(last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
4. Matt Egan, America is Now the World’s Largest Oil Producer, CNN
BUS., (Sept. 12, 2018, 3:02 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/09/12/investing/
us-oil-production-russia-saudi-arabia/index.html [https://perma.cc/8SZR-Q5V4];
Short-Term Energy Outlook, The United States is Now the Largest Global Crude 
Oil Producer, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37053&src=email [https://perma.cc/MTH2-BKXV]
(in February 2018, U.S. crude oil production exceeded that of Saudi Arabia for the
first time in two decades according to preliminary estimates from the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration. Months later, the U.S. crude oil production also 
surpassed Russia for the first time since early 1999).
5. Oil Producing Countries Population, WORLD POPULATION REV.,
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/oil-producing-countries/ [https://per
ma.cc/T45S-4EVV?type=image] (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (as of October 2019
when this Comment was submitted for publication, the United States remained
the top producer in crude oil).
6. Id. (quoting Bob McNally, president of Rapidan Energy Group, a
consulting firm).
7. LOREN C. SCOTT, GROW LA. COAL., THE ENERGY SECTOR: STILL A GIANT 
ECONOMIC ENGINE FOR THE LOUISIANA ECONOMY—AN UPDATE 2–3 (2018) (at 
the time, production of 1.6 billion barrels daily represented 16.7% of the nation’s 
crude oil production).
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the Louisiana Oil and Gas Association, describes the current state of
Louisiana’s oil industry in one word: “stagnant.”8 
Once home to hundreds of offshore rigs, there were only 15 offshore 
rigs and merely 8 land rigs in south Louisiana as of late 2018—a sharp
contrast to the 30 land rigs that the state maintained even during the 1980s 
oil bust.9 What is the reasoning behind this decline in Louisiana’s drilling 
activity which continues to push producers into Texas and Mississippi? 
Perhaps it is the same reason why, as of 2019, Louisiana ranks fifth on the
American Tort Reform’s annual list of Judicial Hellholes: the almost 500 
coastal and legacy lawsuits currently filed against the oil and gas
industry.10 It may also be the reason why Louisiana has become known as a
“litigious state and a judicious hellhole” among both industry participants
and the legal profession.11 
Referring to the “unwanted legacy” that oil and gas operations leave 
behind in the form of actual or alleged contamination, the trend of
plaintiff-landowners filing lawsuits against oil and gas operators alleging 
environmental damage is appropriately known as “legacy litigation.”12 In
Louisiana, legacy litigation may occur at both state and federal levels.13 
Over the last decade, enormous costs of restoring these former waste sites
have “pitted oil companies, landowners, lawyers, and the state against each 
8. Greg Hilburn, It’s a Gusher: US Takes Global Oil Lead, but La. Lags,
MONROE NEWS STAR, https://www.thenewsstar.com/story/news/2018/09/13/its-
gusher-u-s-takes-global-oil-lead-but-la-lags/1288764002/ [https://perma.cc/J2SS
-CPER] (last updated Sept. 13, 2018).
9. Id.
10. Judicial Hellholes, AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., https://www.judicialhell 
holes.org/2018-2019/louisiana/ [https://perma.cc/RGW9-ESBX] (last visited Oct.
2, 2019) (the American Tort Reform Foundation is a nonprofit corporation whose
primary purpose is to educate the general public about how the civil justice system
operates, what role tort law plays in the civil justice system, and the impact tort law
has on the public and private sectors. When determining what states, counties, or
even courts should be listed as a Judicial Hellhole, the foundation identifies places
where judges in civil case systematically apply laws and court procedures in an
unfair and unbalanced manner, and typically to the disadvantage of defendants).
11. Kaki J. Johnson, Comment, The Migration from the Rig to the
Courthouse: Oil and Gas Legacy Litigation in Louisiana, 60 LOY. L. REV. 647,
674 (2014).
12. Loulan Pitre, Jr., “Legacy Litigation” and Act 312 of 2006, 20 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 347, 348 (2007).
13. Johnson, supra note 11 (survey taken in 2012 indicated that more than 
one out of every two barrels of crude pumped from Louisiana’s oil fields were
produced by a lawsuit defendant company).
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562 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
other, turning Louisiana’s oil and gas fields into a legal battleground.”14 
While the majority of these claims end in settlement agreements, those
which are litigated often result in either “dramatic verdicts for the 
plaintiffs” or “distinct victories” for the defense.15 
Historically, legacy litigation had relatively low stakes and garnered 
little attention from the judiciary prior to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
2003 decision in Corbello v. Iowa Production.16 In 2006, the Louisiana 
Legislature enacted Act 312 in response to the public perception that
Corbello allowed landowners to sue for damages significantly in excess of
a land’s value with no obligation to spend any of the damage award on
remediation.17 Act 312 establishes a procedure for claims alleging
environmental damage caused by previous oil and gas operations to ensure
that contaminated land is restored back to a standard consistent with the
health, safety, and welfare of the people.18 Act 312 removes any remediation
awards from the hands of plaintiff-landowners by requiring the deposit of 
these funds directly into the registry of the court.19 The court receiving these
funds bears the responsibility of ensuring that they are expended in a manner
consistent with the adopted remediation plan,20 retaining jurisdiction over
the funds until all remediation efforts are complete.21 
14. Jason P. Theriot, Oilfield Background: Louisiana’s Legacy Lawsuits in 
Historical Perspective, 57 LA. HIST.: J. LA. HIST. ASS’N 403, 460 (2016).
15. Loulan Pitre, Jr. & D’Ann R. Penner, Legacy Litigation–What Is
Reasonable Behavior in the Oilfield, 28 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 334 (2015); See 
generally: Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003) (awarding $33 million
to plaintiff-landowners); Dore Energy v. Carter Langham 901 So. 2d 1238 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 2005) (awarding $57 million to plaintiff-landowners); Marin v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234 (La. 2010) (awarding over $21 million for remediation);
Savoie v. Richard, 137 So. 3d 78 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2014) (awarding $18 million
for remediation); but see also: Meaux v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 26 So. 3d 875 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 2009) (denying $25 million for remediation and awarding zero
recovery to plaintiff-landowners); Houssiere v. Asco USA, 108 So. 3d 797 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 2013) (denying plaintiff request for specific performance of the
contract to have BP remediate any environmental damage to the property).
16. Johnson, supra note 11, at 650; Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686 
(La. 2003).
17. Act No. 312, 2006 La. Acts 2006 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29);
Pitre, Jr., supra note 12; Johnson, supra note 11, at 658.
18. Act No. 312, 2006 La. Acts 2006 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29).
19. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(D)(1) (2006).
20. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(D)(3) (2006).
21. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(D)(4) (2006).
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5632020] COMMENT
With the passage of Act 312 came various procedural and legal issues,
such as challenges to the statute’s constitutionality,22 the scope of 
remediation,23 and the rights of subsequent purchasers.24 To better help 
Act 312 achieve its goal of prohibiting plaintiff-landowners from claiming
excessive damages and in an effort to maintain the court’s active role in
remediation efforts, in 2012 the legislature amended Act 312 in hopes of
clarifying any ambiguities.25 Unfortunately, the legislature’s intentions,
efforts, and attention to detail may now prove to be largely useless in light 
of the first appellate court decision to address settlement agreements in
cases governed by Act 312, decided by the Louisiana Third Circuit Court 
of Appeal in May 2018.26 
Part I of this Comment will discuss the evolution of legacy litigation
in Louisiana by examining the landmark cases which form the framework
of legacy litigation. Part II will discuss the legislature’s response to legacy
litigation, particularly Act 1166 of 2003, Act 312 of 2006, and the 2012 
amendments to Act 312. Part III will discuss the Third Circuit’s most
recent decision regarding settlement agreements in legacy lawsuits
governed by Act 312.27 Using the methods of statutory interpretation, Part
IV will discuss the legislative intent behind Act 312. Part V will provide
reasoning why the procedural requirements of Act 312 should apply to
settlement agreements.
I. BACKGROUND
After drilling the first production well into Louisiana’s Evangeline 
field in 1901,28 the oil and gas industry quickly became the state’s main 
economic enterprise by the middle of the twentieth-century.29 Over a 
century later, two things remain undeniable: (1) the oil and gas sector’s 
22. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16 (La. 2008).
23. Terrebonne Par. Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789 (La. 2005).
24. Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 79 So. 3d 246 (La. 2011).
25. Act No. 779, 2012 La. Acts 2012 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT.
§ 30:29).
26. Britt v. Riceland Petroleum Co., 240 So. 3d 986 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018).
27. Id.
28. Dianne Lindstedt et al., History of Oil and Gas Development in Coastal
Louisiana, LA. GEOLOGICAL SURV. 7 (1991); Ryan J. Romero, Peeling the Onion:
Legacy Lawsuit Litigation and Act 779 of 2012, 41 S.U.L. REV. 105 (2013)
(Louisiana’s first petroleum processing refinery began in 1909; first production 
well over water was completed in 1910).
29. Theriot, supra note 14, at 403.
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564 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
vital role in shaping Louisiana’s economy and way of life,30 and (2) the
significant problems that oilfield waste disposal continues to pose.31 
Produced water is the primary byproduct of oil production, resulting
from water being trapped above, below, or within petroleum-containing
rock.32 Produced water usually contains a combination of harmful
compounds, toxic organics, and radionucleotides.33 Historically,
companies dug unlined, in-ground impoundments called “pits” to house 
the large volumes of oilfield waste until it could be either re-injected into 
subsurface wells, stored for evaporation, or flushed into various
waterways during winter floods.34 Prior to the enactment of Louisiana’s 
first set of comprehensive environmental regulations for oil and gas
production in 1986, this storage method served as the most efficient and 
economical way to handle these waste byproducts, remaining customary
practice for much of the last century.35 Unfortunately, over time, these
“pits” inevitably result in seepage, contaminating both surrounding 
surface and subsurface soils and waters.36 Often very expensive to 
remediate, the discovery of this contamination frequently prompts 
plaintiff-landowners to file environmental lawsuits seeking large sums in
monetary damages and cleanup costs from oil and gas companies for
pollution that typically began decades ago.37 
A. Corbello v. Iowa Production
In the realm of legacy litigation, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
landmark ruling in Corbello v. Iowa Production marked the beginning of 
a “new era” of litigation that transformed Louisiana’s oil and gas fields
into a “legal, political, and environmental battleground.”38 In Corbello, the
jury awarded the plaintiff-landowner $33 million to remediate land valued
at $108,000.39 This award was based on the jury finding that the defendant-
lessee violated the surface lease on a 320-acre tract of land, trespassed after
30. Id.




35. Id. (in 1986, Louisiana passed a comprehensive set of rules governing the
disposal of oilfield waste with Amendments to Statewide Order No. 29-B).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Theriot, supra note 14, at 406.
39. Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003).
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5652020] COMMENT
the lease expired, and polluted the plaintiff-landowners property without
making any effort to clean it up.40 
Since the legislature had not yet mandated remediation or restoration,
the main question on appeal was whether the court had the authority to
modify a breach of contract damage award when the private landowner 
had no duty to actually use the money to clean or restore the land.41 When
weighing the opposing public policy concerns in its analysis, the court 
considered arguments from both sides, such as: (1) the defendant’s 
assertion that unclean land might cause further injury to the public in the
event that the landowners did not use the damage award for remediation,
and (2) the plaintiff’s claim that if landowners cannot sue for cleanup 
costs, only understaffed and underfunded state agencies would be able to 
oppose the oil companies, wherein there existed a strong possibility that 
the land would remain polluted.42 Convinced that the defendant would not
clean the property unless and until forced to do so by a state agency, the 
court affirmed the $33 million award.43 
For future environmental damage claims, the ruling in Corbello had
two significant implications: (1) damages need not be “tethered” to the
value of the property in a claim for breach of a contractual obligation to 
restore property, and (2) under the then-existing law, a landowner
collecting such damages was not required to remediate the property on 
which the claim was based.44 Corbello not only opened the “broader
public’s eyes to the industry’s environmental footprint” but also
“established a template for pursing litigation” against oil and gas 
companies.45 In effect, Corbello gave rise to the public perception that
lands containing oilfield waste pits and pollution had greater monetary 
value than lands without,46 making owning a contaminated property the
equivalent of a winning lottery ticket.47 With no specific regulatory or 
legal framework to oversee and ensure that environmental damage was
remediated, Corbello highlighted a gap in the law: the ability of a plaintiff-
landowner to seek millions of dollars for environmental damage arising
40. Id.
41. Id. at 699.
42. Id. at 701.
43. Id. (the court focused on evidence that the defendant chose to continue its
negligent operations on the plaintiff’s property for over seventy years without
asserting any cleanup efforts, even after such cleanup was recommended by the
defendant’s own experts).
44. Pitre, Jr., supra note 12.
45. Theriot, supra note 14, at 459.
46. Id. at 455–56.
47. Romero, supra note 28, at 120.
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566 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
from previous drilling activities without being subject to any obligation to 
actually remediate the polluted property.48 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT PHASES OF ACT 312
Prior to the enactment of the Louisiana Mineral Code in 1974,49 
plaintiff-landowners could bring claims for environmental damage
originating from oil exploration and production activities under Louisiana
Civil Code articles 2719 and 2720.50 At its core, the Mineral Code focuses 
on creating mutual economic benefits for both producers and
landowners.51 Even though the Mineral Code provided limited guidance 
for environmental contamination claims prior to 2003, this guidance was
not nearly enough to address the “onslaught of legacy cases” filed in the
wake of Corbello.52 In response to the dramatic increase of litigation by 
landowners seeking compensation for environmental damage to their
property, particularly in relation to oil and gas exploration and production 
sites, the legislature acted quickly in hopes of stopping Corbello’s 
potential domino effect by providing some oversight and cost containment
for these remediation efforts.
48. R. Gary Higgins, Jr., Deep-Pocketed or Duty-Bound Defendant: The
Evolution of “Legacy Lawsuits” in Louisiana and the Impact of Acts 779 and 754,
41 S.U. L. REV. 133, 135 (2013); see also Romero, supra note 28, at 120.
49. Act No. 50, 1974 La. Acts Vol. III (codified as LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:1– 
31:214 (1974)); see also Romero, supra note 28, at 110 (the Mineral Code was
enacted during the regular legislative session of 1974, becoming effective on 
January 1, 1975).
50. At the time, Louisiana Civil Code article 2719 read: 
Return of things leased under inventory. If an inventory has been made
of the premises in which the situation, at the time of the lease, has been 
stated, it shall be the duty of the lessee to deliver back everything in the
same state in which it was taken by him, making, however, the necessary 
allowance for wear and tear and for avoidable accidents.
Romero, supra note 28, at 108–09. At the time, Louisiana Civil Code article 
2720 read: “Return of things leased without inventory. If no inventory has 
been made, the lessee is presumed to have received the thing in good order, 
and he must return it in the same state, with the exception contained in the 
preceding article.” Id.
51. Id.
52. Theriot, supra note 14, at 459.
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A. The Initial Response: The “Corbello Bill”
Act 1166 of 2003, often referred to as the “Corbello bill,” is the first
legislative attempt to address the negative impacts of Corbello.53 
Specifically, Act 1166 gives the Department of Natural Resources (DNR)
the authority to intervene in oilfield pollution cases where plaintiffs allege
contamination of usable groundwater as a result of past oilfield activities.54 
With its scope limited to claims of groundwater contamination, Act 1166 
only creates another gap in the law: the ability for “imaginative plaintiffs”
to avoid involving the state in their private matters by constructing their
pleadings in a way that alleges only soil damage, not usable groundwater
contamination.55 In doing so, plaintiffs receiving a judicial demand to 
recover for environmental damage can bypass certain procedural
requirements, rendering Act 1166 worthless.56 
B. A Second Attempt: Act 312 of 2006 
Enacted by the Louisiana Legislature during the 2006 Regular Session,
Act 31257 establishes the procedural framework for environmental damage
claims made by plaintiff-landowners who allege environmental
53. Act No. 1166, 2003 La. Acts 3511 (codified as LA. REV. STAT. §
30.2015.1 (2006)) (specifically, Act 1166: (1) requires certain notifications to be
sent to the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (LDNR) and the Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) in the event that any judicial
demand to recover damages for alleged contamination to usable groundwater was
rendered; (2) provides the LDNR and the LDEQ a right of action to intervene in
such a judicial proceeding; (3) requires the submission of a plan for the evaluation
of remediation to the LDNR and LDEQ for review and approval; (4) prohibits a
court from adopting a remediation plan without first consulting the LDNR or 
LDEQ; and (5) requires that the funds awarded for groundwater contamination be
placed in the registry of the court to ensure completion of the remediation plan).
54. Theriot, supra note 14, at 456. 
55. PATRICK OTTINGER, LOUISIANA MINERAL LEASES: A TREATISE, § 4-26 
at 571 (Claitor’s Law Books & Publ’g Div., Inc., 2016); THOMAS SHACHTMANN,
TO DO THE RIGHT THING: AN EPIC COURTROOM BATTLE AGAINST BIG OIL OVER 
THE RESTORATION OF A GULF COAST MARSH 101 (Cameron Meadows Pres. Tr.,
2010).
56. Pitre, Jr., supra note 12, at 348, 350.
57. Signed by Governor Kathleen Blanco, Act 312 amends the Conservation
Act and enacts § 30.29, 29.1, and 2015.1(L) to require environmental assessments
and cleanups of allegedly contaminated oilfield sites.
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  214 5/21/20  8:23 AM




      
    
   
    
   
      
      
   
     
   
 
  
    
 
    
    
     
 
    
    
 




    
 
   
 
  
       
   
   
    
       




    
      
      
568 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
contamination from previous oil and gas operations.58 Within the first few
lines of Act 312, the legislature declares that pursuant to Article IX, Section 1 
of the Louisiana Constitution, “the natural resources and the environment of
the state, including groundwater, are to be protected, conserved, and 
replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and 
welfare of the people.”59 Furthermore, Act 312 recognizes that it is the “duty 
of the legislature to set forth procedures to ensure that damage to the
environment is remediated to a standard that protects the public interest”60 and 
“further mandates that the legislature enact laws to implement this policy.”61 
At its core, Act 312 sets forth a process by which the state, through the
Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (DNR), maintains direct 
involvement in environmental remediation actions.62 Applicable “immediately
upon the filing or amendment of any litigation or pleading making a judicial
demand arising from or alleging environmental damage,”63 Act 312 
facilitates environmental remediation of oilfield sites to state standards by
following a site-specific, defendant-funded, court-approved, and court-
supervised remediation plan64 when a court finds a party liable for cleanup.65 
Act 312 specifically mandates the state’s involvement in the 
environmental remediation process if a party admits liability or is found to 
be legally responsible by the court at any point during the proceedings.66 
When this occurs, the liable party must develop a remediation plan and
58. Act No. 312, 2006 La. Acts 1472 (“Act No. 312 of 2006”) (specifically,
Act 312: (1) applies to all litigation claiming environmental damages arising from 
oilfield operations, not just those alleging usable groundwater contamination; (2)
requires timely notice of any such litigation to be given to the State; (3) allows the
State to intervene in such litigation by providing a role for the Office of
Conservation within the LDNR to determine the most feasible plan for evaluation 
and/or remediation of the environmental damage, in addition to overseeing the 
actual implementation of the plan it determines to be most feasible; and (4) allows
the landowner and the State to recover expert fees, attorney fees, and costs from
the responsible party or parties); Pitre, Jr., supra note 12, at 351.
59. LA. REV. STAT. § 30.29(A) (2006).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Romero, supra note 28, at 107.
63. LA. REV. STAT. § 30.29(A) (as defined in § 30.29(I)(2), “environmental
damage” shall mean “any actual or potential impact, damage, or injury to
environmental media caused by contamination resulting from activities associated
with oilfield sites or exploration and production sites. Environmental media shall 
include but not be limited to soil, surface water, groundwater, or sediment.”).
64. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234 (La. 2010).
65. Pitre, Jr., supra note 12, at 358.
66. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(C)(1) (2006).
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5692020] COMMENT
submit it to the DNR for review.67 Upon submission, the DNR, plaintiff,
and any other party with a vested interest is allowed a minimum of 30 days 
to review the plan and either provide their own plan or comment in
response.68 After a public hearing on the submitted plan(s) and any 
responses thereto, the DNR shall approve the plan it determines to be the 
“most feasible.”69 The court shall then adopt the DNR’s approved plan,
merging it with the final judgment.70 After a plan is agreed on, Act 312 
requires that any funds awarded for purposes of evaluation and 
remediation be deposited exclusively into the registry of the court rather
than given to the plaintiffs.71 While the court retains jurisdiction over these 
funds through completion of the remediation plan,72 both the court and the
DNR retain oversight of the defendant’s cleanup efforts to ensure
compliance with the remediation plan.73 Any funds remaining in the
registry of the court are returned to the depositor once the cleanup efforts
are complete.74 
Hailed by former Governor Kathleen Blanco as a milestone in the 
management of Louisiana’s oil and gas environmental impacts, Act 312 
“restores the balance needed between economic development and the 
environment,” a balance that was disrupted by legacy lawsuits stilling oil 
and gas exploration, creating an uncertain business climate, and leaving 
oil and gas sites damaged.75 Filling the gap left by Act 1166, Act 312 
applies regardless of whether the environmental damage claim is for 
groundwater contamination or for surface contamination.76 Not only is Act 
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(C)(2); Feasibility plan is defined this way:
Feasible Plan means the most reasonable plan which addresses
environmental damage in conformity with the requirements of Louisiana
Constitution Article IX, Section 1 to protect the environment, public
health, safety and welfare, and is in compliance with the specific relevant 
and applicable standards and regulations promulgated by a state agency 
in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act in effect at the time 
of cleanup to remediate contamination resulting from oilfield or
exploration and production operations or waste.
LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(I)(4).
70. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(C)(5)–(6).
71. OTTINGER supra note 55, § 4-26(d)(2). 
72. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(D)(4) (2006).
73. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(F) (2006).
74. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(D)(4) (2006).
75. Theriot, supra note 14, at 456.
76. Romero, supra note 28, at 121.
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570 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
312 constitutional,77 it is strictly procedural and does not limit a
landowner’s right to recover damages in addition to the funds approved by 
the trial court as necessary to remediate the land back to state standards.78 
1. Applying Act 312: Discovering the Shortcomings
Despite the legislature’s intent to bring more rationality and 
consistency to legacy litigation, Act 312 initially achieved little
remediation due to the novel legal issues it created in practice.79 For
example, often in legacy lawsuits a defendant may not admit fault on all 
of the plaintiff-landowner’s claims but may be willing to concede liability
for the environmental damage to the property in question.80 Prior to the
Act’s 2012 amendments, a party conceding liability would be permitted to 
develop a remediation plan through the process provided in Act 312 but 
would nonetheless remain a party to the litigation despite this admission.81 
Not only would this delay remediation until after the court decided the 
case, culpable defendants had no incentive to come forward and begin the
process of remediation under Act 312 since they would remain in the
tedious, resource-consuming litigation even after conceding responsibility 
for the property damage.82 
In the Louisiana Legislature’s 2011 Regular Session, the oil and gas
industry strongly supported two bills: Senate Bill 146 and House Bill
563.83 Following an “unsuccessful”84 2011 Regular Session, the Louisiana
Legislature asked the DNR to study House Bill 563 and report any 
77. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16 (La. 2008).
78. OTTINGER, supra note 55, § 4-26.
79. Loulan Pitre, Jr., Six Years Later: Louisiana Legacy Lawsuits since Act
312, 1 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 94, 116 (2012).
80. State v. La. Land & Expl. Co., 110 So. 3d 1038, 1041 (La. 2013).
81. Johnson, supra note 11, at 680.
82. Id.
83. S.B. 146, 37th Reg. Sess. (La. 2011); H.B. 563, 37th Reg. Sess. (La.
2011); Pitre, Jr., supra note 79, at 109 (S.B. 146 was presented by Senator Adley
and the duplicate, H.B. 563, was presented by Representative Cortez. These
original bills were short “placeholder” bills, intended to be amended as they went 
through the legislative process.).
84. Shortly before a House Natural Resources Committee hearing on H.B.
563, extensive amendments were circulated and the bill was subsequently
involuntarily deferred in committee, effectively killing the legislation for the
session. See also, History of H.B. 563, 37th Reg. Sess. (La. 2011) available at
http://www.legis.state.la.us [https://perma.cc/Z7DX-X3QY] (follow “Sessions”
hyperlink; follow “2011 Regular Legislative Session” hyperlink; then search for 
“HB 563”; and click on “History” hyperlink) (last visited September 21, 2019).
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5712020] COMMENT
findings.85 This report found that of the 271 legacy lawsuits subject to Act
312, 60 did not provide a specific site description; only 61 were supported
by testing data submitted to the DNR as required by law; only 2 were
identified by the Louisiana Office of Conservation86 as having long-term
risk;87 and only 1 case had gone through a complete hearing process at the 
Office of Conservation, but had not yet adopted or implemented any plans 
pursuant to Act 312.88 Moreover, the report found that of the 64 cases that
settled, 29 were made without the Office of Conservation receiving
environmental data; and of the 35 remaining cases, only 3 required
remediation while the other 32 had environmental data showing there was
no need to remediate.89 This report from the Office of Conservation
ultimately served as the “backdrop” for re-assessing Act 312 during the 
Louisiana Legislature’s 2012 Regular Session and effectively set the stage
for a “legislative battle” in 2012.90 
85. H.R. Con. Res. 167, 37th Reg. Sess. (La. 2011); J. BLAKE CANFIELD, STATE
OF LA. DEP’T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, REPORT TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATURAL
RESOURCES AS REQUESTED IN HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 167, 2011
REGULAR LEGISLATIVE SESSION (2012); Pitre, Jr., supra note 79, at 110.
86. The Louisiana Office of Conservation is a branch of the Louisiana
Department of Natural Resources. 
87. Upon receiving environmental test data, Conservation’s staff reviews the 
data for completeness and Quality Assurance/Quality Control purposes to ensure
that the data is compliant with DNR’s Lab Manual. Upon review, Conservation
classifies sites based upon the DEQ RECAP Site Ranking System which is
designed to identify any site that poses an immediate and severe health risk to the 
public or the environment. The classification includes Ranks 1-4: Rank (1)
includes sites that pose an immediate threat to human health, safety, or sensitive 
environmental receptors; Rank (2) includes sites that pose a short-term (0-2 years)
threat to human health, safety, or sensitive environmental receptors; Rank (3) 
includes sites that pose a long-term (>2 years) threat to human health, safety, or
sensitive environmental receptors; and Rank (4) includes sites which pose no 
demonstrable long-term threat to human health, safety, or sensitive environmental
receptors. At the time of the report, of the sixty-one Act 312 lawsuits that 
Conservation had received environmental test data for, no site was found to rise 
to a Rank 1 or 2 classification, two cases had sites classified as Rank 3, and fifty-
nine cases had sites classified as Rank 4.
88. J. BLAKE CANFIELD, STATE OF LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, REPORT
TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES AS REQUESTED IN HOUSE
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 167, 2011 REGULAR LEGISLATIVE SESSION (2012).
89. Id.
90. Pitre, Jr., supra note 79, at 110.
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572 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
C. Back to the Development Phases: Amending Act 312 
In 2012, the Louisiana Legislature amended Act 312 for the first time
since its enactment six years prior.91 With over 20 bills filed relating to 
legacy litigation, the result of this “all-out battle for the oil and gas 
industry”92 is often referred to as a “legislative compromise.”93 While the
majority of this compromise package addresses admissions of
responsibility for environmental damage through Act 779,94 the package 
also creates two novel procedures through Act 754.95 
1. Act 77996 
Act 779 revises the procedural framework of legacy litigation by
supplanting the pretrial procedure ordinarily followed in environmental
remediation actions.97 This amendment creates a procedure by which a
91. Id. at 96.
92. Romero, supra note 28, at 125 (quoting Don Briggs, A Successful
Legislative Session for Oil and Gas, BEAUREGARD DAILY NEWS, June 7, 2012).
93. The 2012 Regular Legislative Session enacted articles 1552 and 1563 of 
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and amended and reenacted portions of
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 30:29 with Act No. 754 and Act No. 779.
94. Act. No. 779, 2012 La. Acts 2012 (a party admitting liability under
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 30:29 may make a “limited admission,” i.e., limit the
admission to responsibility for remediation to applicable regulatory standards).
95. Act. No. 754, 2012 La. Acts 2012; Pitre, Jr., supra note 79, at 113.
96. Act No. 779, 2012 La. Acts 2012 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT.
§ 30.29) (Act 779 amends and reenacts certain portions of Louisiana Revised 
Statutes § 30:29, codified as Louisiana Revised Statutes § 30:29(B)(6)).
97. Id. (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. § 30.29 (this Act became 
effective on August 1, 2012; it applies to any lawsuit not set for trial on or before
May 15, 2012. The eight major changes from the previous law are: (1) it regulates 
discovery issues involving the formulation and approval of the most feasible plan
by allowing any party to subpoena, for the purposes of deposition or trial, any 
employee, contractor, or representative of the LDNR or agency involved in the 
formulation of the most feasible plan; (2) it provides a procedure for the defendant 
to request a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is good cause for
maintaining the defendant as a party in the litigation; (3) it suspends the
prescriptive period for one year for the claims it covers; (4) it provides that if a
public hearing is held following a limited admission, there cannot be a second
public hearing for the same environmental damage; (5) it prevents ex parte
communication between parties and anyone involved in the formulation of the 
most feasible plan until after the LDNR has approved and submitted the most
feasible plan to the court; (6) it provides a procedure for the review of a plan that
requires regulatory standards of agencies beside the LDNR; (7) it allows the 
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5732020] COMMENT
defendant may request a preliminary hearing to determine whether
environmental contamination requiring remediation exists, and, if so,
whether there is good cause for maintaining the defendant as a party in the 
litigation.98 Providing another layer to an already complex litigation 
scheme, Act 779 serves as additional vetting for plaintiffs in
environmental damage actions to proceed beyond initial pleadings.99 
2. Act 754
Act 754 enacted Article 1552 and Article 1563 in the Louisiana Code 
of Civil Procedure.100 Article 1552 outlines the procedure to request an
environmental management order, while Article 1563 allows a defendant
in a suit filed under Act 312 to limit his or her admission of liability to 
only the responsibility for implementing the most feasible plan.101 
Under Article 1563, a party admitting liability may make a “limited 
admission” for remediation to applicable regulatory standards without
waiving their defenses to any private claims for additional damages.102 
When a party chooses to make a limited admission, the court shall make a
timely referral to the Office of Conservation to conduct a public hearing
LDNR to issue compliance orders to the responsible party or operator of record;
and (8) it provides for a waiver of the right to enforce the contractual right to
indemnification against such punitive damages caused by the responsible party’s 
acts or omission, if the responsible party admits responsibility for the remediation
of the environmental damage under applicable regulatory standards).
98. LA. REV. STAT. § 30.29(B)(6) (2012) (at this preliminary hearing, a 
plaintiff bears the initial burden of introducing evidence to support the allegations
of environmental damage to his property. If the plaintiff satisfies this, the burden 
shifts to the moving party, who then bears the burden of demonstrating the 
absence of a genuine fact that he caused, or is otherwise legally responsible for,
the alleged environmental damage. The parties can introduce evidence in affidavit 
or written form. Successful defendants will be dismissed without prejudice,
subject to being brought back in upon discovery of evidence not reasonably 
available at the time of the preliminary dismissal. A defendant obtaining a
preliminary dismissal will be entitled to a dismissal with prejudice following a
final non-appealable judgment in the case).
99. Romero, supra note 28, at 107.
100. Act. No. 754, 2012 La. Acts 2012; Rick Curry, New Legislation to 
Address Legacy Lawsuits in Louisiana, MCGLINCHEY STAFFORD (June 14, 2002), 
https://www.mcglinchey.com/New-Legislation-to-Address-Legacy-Lawsuits-in-
Louisiana-06-14-2012/ [https://perma.cc/PY82-NG5D].
101. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1552 (2012). LA. CODE. CIV. PROC. art. 1563
(2012).
102. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1563 (A)(1)-(2).
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574 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
to either approve or structure a remediation plan to regulatory standards.103 
After adopting the most feasible remediation plan, the Office of
Conservation is required to facilitate the plan’s implementation,104 and the
party admitting responsibility shall be required to deposit funds to cover
the Office of Conservation’s costs with at least an initial deposit of
$100,000.105 
Designed to promote efficient remediation and less complex
adjudication, the 2012 amendments to Act 312 present a “more refined
system that recognizes the importance of both Louisiana’s ecosystem and
economy” by “effectively [balancing] protection of the environment with 
stimulation of the oil and gas industry.”106 Yet despite these 2012
amendments, a new question as to Act 312’s applicability now exists— 
particularly regarding settlement agreements. 
III. BRITT V. RICELAND PETROLEUM COMPANY107 
On June 25, 2014, eight individuals, all domiciliaries of Jefferson
Parish, filed suit against Riceland Petroleum Company (Riceland) and BP 
America Production Company (BP), the current and former operators of
the plaintiff’s property.108 Over two years later, Riceland filed a third-party 
demand adding alleged insurers (herein “Certain Insurers”) of Riceland as
103. Act No. 779, 2012 La. Acts 2012 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT.
§ 30.29) (there is a one-time limit to formulating remediation plans after an 
admission of responsibility, and there is a prohibition against ex parte
communication with agency personnel during such formulation).
104. Id. (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. § 30.29); LA. REV. STAT. § 
30.29(C)(2) (2006).
105. Pitre, Jr., supra note 79, at 113.
106. Johnson, supra note 11, at 681.
107. 240 So. 3d 986 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018).
108. The petition stated the following: 
Plaintiffs appear in one or more of the following capacities: (1) lessors,
assignees, and third-party beneficiaries of certain mineral and surface 
leases between plaintiffs and defendants; (2) successors in interest to 
certain mineral and surface leases between plaintiffs and defendants; (3) 
owners of Property contaminated by the oil and gas activities conducted
or controlled by one of more of the defendants; (4) successors in interest
to, or the assigns of, the owners of Property contaminated by the oil and 
gas activities conducted or controlled by one or more of the defendants; 
(5) servitude owners who have the right to sue for remediation damages
under the Mineral Code; and (6) parties who possess the right of action 
to file this lawsuit under Louisiana law.
Petition for Damages at 3, Britt, 240 So. 3d 986 (No. C-397-14).
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third-party defendants, asserting claims for contribution and indemnity, as
well as a claim for defense costs incurred.109 Certain Insurers answered,
denying coverage under any and all of Riceland’s applicable policies.110 
The plaintiff-landowners alleged that the defendants were “liable for
damage resulting from the operation of the gas plant and wells in the South 
Jennings Oil & Gas Field” and the “operation of other equipment and 
facilities related thereto located on the property and adjacent property.”111 
The plaintiff-landowners also sued for damages alleging that the
defendants: (1) knowingly disposed of toxic and hazardous materials onto
plaintiffs’ property; (2) allowed the migration of this pollution to offsite 
properties; (3) failed to properly maintain their facilities where these toxic 
and hazardous materials were transported, handled, stored, or disposed of; 
and (4) egregiously violated applicable environmental health and safety
regulations and applicable field-wide orders.112 The plaintiff-landowners
alleged that the defendants, who operated as early as the 1930s, or at some
time thereafter, knew or should have known that their day-to-day
operations and disposal methods were causing the soil, surface water, and
groundwater of the property to be contaminated with dangerous 
substances.113 In fact, the plaintiff-landowners alleged that for many years,
the defendants did know that they were disposing, storing, discharging,
and otherwise releasing toxic poisons and pollutants onto and into the
ground, groundwater, and surface water on or near the plaintiffs’ property,
and instead chose to cover and conceal the contamination.114 
Believing that these actions constitute wanton or reckless disregard for 
public safety in the storage, handling, or transportation of hazardous or
toxic substances, the plaintiff-landowners sought both punitive and
exemplary damages, as well as a prohibitory and mandatory permanent
injunction requiring and ordering the defendants to remove any
109. Brief for Appellants at 6, Britt, 240 So. 3d 986 (No. 17-941). 
110. Britt, 240 So. 3d at 989. 
111. Petition for Damages, supra note 108, at 3–4 (“Defendants’ activities
include the operation or construction of various oil and gas facilities, including 
but not limited to, a gas plant, pit, wells, sumps, flowlines, pipelines, tank 
batteries, wellheads, measuring facilities, separators, and injection facilities.”).
112. Id. at 13–14.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 7 (At no time did the defendants inform or warn the plaintiffs 
concerning the extent, nature, cause, or origin of this pollution. The defendants 
did not disclose that the wastes from the oil and gas activities would not degrade
or break down in the environment in the foreseeable future, constituting an
“ongoing and continuing source of pollution and environmental damage for
generations.”).
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576 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
contamination they caused to the groundwater and soils underlying 
plaintiffs’ lands.115 To the extent that Louisiana Revised Statutes section
30:29 applies, the plaintiff-landowners sought a judgment approving a
feasible plan that complied with all applicable state regulations, and that 
protected and replenished the natural resources of the state.116 
After reaching a compromise to resolve all of the plaintiff-
landowners’ claims against BP and Riceland, the plaintiff-landowners
gave notice and a redacted copy of the settlement agreement to the DNR
and the Attorney General (AG) on April 28, 2017, as required by 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29(J)(1).117 Receiving no objection 
from the DNR, the plaintiffs filed a motion for approval on May 16, 2017,
seeking court approval of the settlement agreement proposed between the 
plaintiffs, Riceland, and BP.118 In the redacted copy of the proposed
settlement agreement attached to the motion, the settlement purported to 
resolve all claims between the plaintiffs, Riceland, and BP in exchange for 
a redacted settlement amount and Riceland and BP’s promise to conduct 
certain remediation activities on the property.119 However, the plaintiffs
115. Id. at 16 (plaintiffs stated causes of action in tort as well as separate causes
of action for: breach of contract; breach of obligations imposed by the Mineral 
Code and Civil Code; breach of implied obligations under the Mineral Code and 
Civil Code; and for the violation of the provisions of Civil Code and Mineral
Code. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought the following damages: (A) sufficient
funds to conduct a complete scientific analysis of the extent and nature of the
contamination of their Property associated with defendants’ operation of waste 
pits, tank batteries, production and/or injection wells, pipelines, and other oil and 
gas related facilities and equipment; (B) the cost to restore the Property to its pre-
polluted original condition; (C) punitive or exemplary damages; (D) An award of 
damages for defendants’ unauthorized use of plaintiffs’ land to store and dispose
of their wastes without consent, or compensation to plaintiffs from time of
placement to time of final removal; (E) An award for stigma damages for 
diminution in property value before, during, and after restoration; (F) Any civil
fruits derived from defendants’ illegal trespass; (G) Damages occasioned by the
nuisance created by defendants, including loss of full use and enjoyment of
plaintiffs’ Property; (H) Damages for loss of use of land and loss profits and 
income; (I) Attorneys’ fees and other costs and expenses under La. R.S. § 30:29,
or under any contract or applicable law that specifically provides for attorney fees,
costs, and expenses; and (J) Damages sustained as a result of defendants’ failure
to provide proper notification under article 2688).
116. Id. at 20.
117. Britt, 240 So. 3d at 989. 
118. Id.
119. Brief for Appellants, supra note 109, at 6–7 (also attached to the motion
for approval of settlement was a letter from the DNR, stating that the “Settlement
Communication does not disclose the actual amount of the settlement, nor is there
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5772020] COMMENT
sought to reserve any claims against any and all insurers of the released
parties, and Riceland agreed to assign to the plaintiffs any and all rights,
causes of action, claims, or abilities to recover under any applicable
insurance contracts.120 Less than ten days after receiving the motion for
approval of settlement and without conducting any hearing, the district 
court signed a judgment approving and granting the motion.121 
Having not consented to the May 25 approval, Certain Insurers
requested a conference with the trial court.122 During a telephone
conference on June 1, the district court acknowledged that the approval
was premature and agreed to hold a meeting on the matter eight days 
later.123 At the subsequent hearing, Certain Insurers again maintained that
they did not oppose the settlement per se, but that pursuant to Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 30:29(J), the district court was required to hold a
contradictory hearing to determine if remediation was necessary and, if so,
to order the deposit of any remediation funds into the registry of the court 
prior to approving any settlement agreement.124 Acknowledging that it
should have set the matter for hearing based on Certain Insurers’ objection,
the district court voided the May 25 approval but subsequently approved 
the settlement agreement again without making any findings as to whether 
remediation was necessary and without requiring the deposit of any
remediation funds into the registry of the court.125 On appeal to the Third 
Circuit, the primary issue before the court became a question of statutory 
interpretation, specifically regarding Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
30:29(J)(1).126 
any reference as to whether any portion of the settlement amount will be deposited 
into the registry of the court pursuant to [§ 29(J)].”).
120. Id. at 6 (the settlement agreement specifically did not resolve any claims
against Riceland’s insurers or the co-defendant, ConocoPhillips Company).
121. Brief for Defendant-Appellees at 6–7, Britt, 240 So. 3d 986 (No. 17-941).
122. Brief for Appellants at 8, Britt, 240 So. 3d 986 (No. 17-941).
123. Id. at 8–9.
124. Britt, 240 So 3d at 989 (Certain Insurers requested, at a minimum, that
the district court make a ruling that no remediation besides what was provided for
in the Settlement Agreement was necessary since the plaintiffs intended to pursue
claims for the exact same damage against Certain Insurers as alleged insurers of
Riceland.).
125. Transcript of Hearing at 706, Britt, 240 So. 3d 986 (No. C-397-14).
126. Britt, 240 So. 3d at 990. 
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578 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF ACT 312: A SEARCH FOR THE 
LEGISLATURE’S INTENT
Statutory interpretation begins with examining the language of the 
statute itself.127 As Louisiana Civil Code article 9 provides, “when a law 
is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd 
consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further
interpretation may be made in search of the legislature’s intent.”128 As a 
general rule, courts are to construe words and phrases according to their 
common and approved usage; the word “shall” indicates that something is
mandatory, the word “may” indicates that something is permissive.129 
The language of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29(J) provides:
In the event that any settlement is reached in a case subject to the 
provisions of this Section, the settlement shall be subject to
approval by the court. The department and the attorney general
shall be given notice once the parties have reached a settlement in
principle. The department shall then have no less than thirty days
to review that settlement and comment to the court before the
court certifies the settlement. If after a contradictory hearing the 
court requires remediation, the court shall not certify or approve 
any settlement until an amount of money sufficient to fund such
remediation is deposited into the registry of the court. No funding 
of a settlement shall occur until the requirements of this Section 
have been satisfied. However, the court shall have the discretion
to waive the requirements of this Section if the settlement reached
is for a minimal amount and is not dispositive of the entire 
litigation.130 
After applying a plain reading of this specific provision, the Third Circuit
in Britt found only three requirements applicable to all settlements in
claims governed by Act 312: (1) that the settlement “shall be subject” to
the trial court’s approval; but before which (2) notice of the settlement 
“shall be given” to the DNR and the AG; and (3) the DNR and the AG
“shall then have” 30 days to review the settlement and provide any
comment to the trial court.131 The Third Circuit also found that Louisiana
127. Id.
128. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2019).
129. LA. REV. STAT. § 1:3.
130. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(J)(1) (2006).
131. Britt v. Riceland Petroleum Co., 240 So. 3d 986, 991 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2018).
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5792020] COMMENT
Revised Statutes section 30:29(J)(1) does not require: (1) a contradictory 
hearing; (2) a finding concerning remediation; or (3) a deposit of necessary
funds for court approval in all settlements under Act 312.132 In the Third 
Circuit’s opinion, reading these requirements into the statute would, in
effect, “expand its provisions beyond the explicit intent of the legislature,
which both contemplated and sought to encourage court-approved 
settlements in these legacy lawsuits.”133 
The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and
enforce the intent of the legislature.134 Thus, in all cases of statutory 
interpretation, the fundamental question is legislative intent and 
ascertainment of the reason(s) that prompted the legislature to enact the
law.135 If the language of a law is susceptible to different meanings, the 
language must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to
the purpose of the law.136 When interpreting statutes, courts “should give 
effect to all parts of a statute and should not give a statute an interpretation 
that makes any part superfluous or meaningless.”137 Unfortunately, the
Third Circuit’s statutory interpretation does just that—renders
meaningless the procedure of Act 312 in cases where the parties agree to
settle.
A. A Determination of Remediation is Mandatory, Otherwise Act 312
Does Not Apply
As the legislature states in the plain language of Act 312, the natural 
resources and the environment of the state are to be “protected, conserved,
and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety,
and welfare of the people.”138 Pursuant to the legislature’s duty to set forth 
procedures to ensure that damage to the environment is remediated to a 
standard that protects the public interest, Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 30:29 provides the procedure for judicial resolution of claims for
environmental damage to property arising from activities subject to the
jurisdiction of the Department of Natural Resources, office of
conservation.139 Once a party makes a judicial demand arising from or
132. Id. at 990.
133. Id. at 992.
134. Id. at 990.
135. In re Succession of Boyter, 756 So. 2d 1122, 1129 (La. 2000).
136. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co. v. Oleum Operating Co., L.C., 229 So. 3d
993, 996 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2017).
137. Id. at 997.
138. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(A) (2006).
139. Id.
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580 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
alleging environmental damage, the provisions of the statute shall apply
once timely notice is received by the state of Louisiana through the DNR,
the commissioner of conservation, and the attorney general.140 
When drafting Act 312, the legislature carefully noted certain
fundamental, threshold requirements that must be satisfied in order for Act 
312’s procedure to apply.141 To prevent frivolous environmental damage
claims, “contamination” shall include the “introduction or presence of
substances or contaminants into a usable aquifer, an underground source
of drinking water (USDW) or soil in such quantities as to render them
unsuitable for their reasonably intended purposes.”142 Claims of
environmental damage shall include “any actual or potential impact,
damage, or injury to environmental media caused by contamination
resulting from activities associated with oilfield sites or exploration and 
production sites,” including, but not limited to, environmental media such
as soil, surface water, ground water, or sediment.143 Evaluation and
remediation shall include, but not be limited to, “the investigation, testing,
monitoring, containment, prevention, or abatement” of the contaminated
144area. 
With these precise, particular definitions, Act 312 applies only to those 
claims with evidence of actual or potential impact, damage, or injury to 
environmental media caused by contamination resulting from activities
associated with oilfield exploration and production sites.145 If a claim does
not meet this threshold criteria, the claim is not subject to the procedure
set forth in Act 312.146 For this simple reason, a court must find
remediation necessary because until such finding is made, the court cannot
be sure whether Act 312 even applies. This factual finding is critical
because if remediation is necessary for the land to be in compliance with
the applicable regulatory standards, Act 312 requires the court to utilize 
the “sequenced protocol” that the legislature has established for “the
management of cases alleging environmental contamination and the 
remediation of contaminated properties.”147 
140. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(B)(1).
141. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(I) (specifically, the statute defines “contamination,”
“environmental damage,” “evaluation or remediation,” “feasible plan,” “oil field” or 
“exploration and production (E&P) site,” and “timely notice”).
142. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(I)(1).
143. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(I)(2).
144. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(I)(3) (2006).
145. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(I)(2) (2006).
146. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(J)(1) (2006).
147. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co. v. Oleum Operating Co., L.C., 229 So. 3d
993, 997 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2017).
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5812020] COMMENT
B. If Remediation is Necessary, the Deposit of Funds is Mandatory
It is a determination that remediation is necessary and not the holding
of a contradictory hearing that triggers the requisite deposit of funds into
the registry of the court. Likewise, if any remediation is necessary, the 
court should only approve a settlement agreement once the defendant 
deposits the funds necessary to implement the remediation plan into the
registry of the court. As Act 312 states:
[w]hether or not the department or the attorney general intervenes,
and except as provided in Subsection H of this Section, all damages
or payments in any civil action, including interest thereon, awarded
for the evaluation or remediation of environmental damage shall be
paid exclusively into the registry of the court in an interest-bearing
account with the interest accruing to the account for cleanup.148 
Even further, the statute allows the court discretion to waive this 
requirement only if the settlement reached is “for a minimal amount and 
is not dispositive of the entire litigation.”149 If the legislature intended for
the court to have discretion to waive the deposit of funds in any and all
settlement agreements, this provision would not be necessary.
As the Third Circuit pointed out in Britt, the phrase “shall be paid 
exclusively into the registry of the court” implies that the deposit of all 
damages or payments in any civil action—including settlement payments
—into the registry of the court is mandatory, so long as these damages or
payments are compensation for the evaluation or remediation of
environmental damage.150 The statute states that the “court shall retain 
jurisdiction over the funds deposited and the party or parties admitting 
responsibility, or the party or parties found legally responsible by the 
court, until such time as the evaluation or remediation is completed.”151 If 
courts continue to follow the Third Circuit’s interpretation that the deposit
of funds into the registry of the court is not required, what happens to the 
defendant who goes bankrupt shortly after settling? In such a scenario,
there would be no relief for the parties, nor for the damaged land.
148. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(D)(1) (2006).
149. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(J)(1) (2006).
150. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(D)(1).
151. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(D)(4). 
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C. The Purpose Behind a Contradictory Hearing
According to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29(J)(1), if after a 
“contradictory” hearing to ensure that the proposed remediation plan
aligns with the DNR’s evaluation and assessment, remediation or 
additional remediation is necessary, the court shall not certify or approve
any settlement until an amount of money sufficient to fund such
remediation is deposited into the registry of the court.152 In Britt, the Third 
Circuit focused on the fact that “contradictory,” when used as an adjective,
is generally understood to mean opposing or inconsistent views.153 Thus,
the court reasoned that the need for a hearing is triggered by and
conditioned upon an objection to the remediation plan proposed by the
settling parties; if no opposition or concern for the settlement is raised by 
either the state actors or another party with a vested interest, then there is
no corresponding need for a contradictory hearing and determination by 
the court on the issue of remediation.154 
However, the Third Circuit’s interpretation that a “contradictory”
hearing is not required in settlement agreements disregards the legislative
intent behind Act 312. In the realm of legacy litigation, parties who agree to
settle save the court from waiting until trial to determine who is responsible
for the environmental damage. By agreeing that environmental damage
exists and proposing a remediation plan with funding estimates in the form
of a settlement agreement, the parties are, in a way, merely expediting the
remediation efforts. Even when parties agree to settle, the DNR still has a
responsibility to review the environmental data submitted to determine if
remediation is necessary and if so, whether the submitted remediation and 
estimation of funds is the “most feasible” plan for the court to adopt.155 If 
the DNR reviews the requisite information in a motion for approval of
settlement and determines from the environmental data submitted that
additional remediation or funds are necessary than what the proposed
settlement agreement accounts for, then the DNR at that point would trigger
the need for a contradictory hearing. Similarly, if the DNR reviews the
information and determines the land already meets the state regulatory
standards and no remediation is necessary, a contradictory hearing would be
triggered for the court, acting as a gatekeeper, to decide whether the case
even falls under Act 312. If the court agrees with the DNR that remediation
152. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29 (J)(1).
153. Britt v. Riceland Petroleum Co., 240 So. 3d 986, 991 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2018).
154. Id.
155. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(I)(4) (2006).
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5832020] COMMENT
is not necessary for the land to meet state standards, the procedure found in
Act 312 does not apply.
D. The DNR’s Responsibility Remains the Same, Even in Settlement
Agreements
In accordance with Louisiana’s public policy favoring settlement 
agreements, the reality of legacy litigation is that many cases settle before
going to trial.156 Most often, a plaintiff’s experts insist that appropriate
remediation will cost millions of dollars, while experts for the defense
usually have a much lower assessment of the need for and extent of 
remediation.157 With these competing expert assessments driving the
majority of cases to settlement, plaintiff-landowners typically agree to
accept some amount of money—often a large amount, but a modest
percentage of their expert’s damage estimate—in exchange for an 
agreement to allow the defendants to remediate the property on their own
according to the regulatory standards acceptable to the Office of
Conservation, instead of urging a remediation plan that will cost hundreds
of millions of dollars.158 As a neutral third-party to these conflicting
estimations, the DNR has an even greater responsibility when reviewing
and approving remediation plans attached to settlement agreements.
In Britt, the settling parties sent a redacted copy of their settlement 
agreement to the DNR for approval.159 As the DNR’s letter to the court
noted, the settlement agreement sent for approval did not disclose the
actual amount of settlement, nor was there any reference to whether any
portion of the settlement amount was going to be deposited into the
registry of the court to cover remediation or evaluation costs.160 Despite
these omissions, the DNR still signed the motion for approval, which the
Third Circuit interpreted as the settlement agreement receiving the DNR’s 
confirmation.161 
Counsel for the defendants pointed out to the court that not long after
receiving the letter of no objection from the DNR, Riceland received 
correspondence from the DNR asking Riceland to develop a cleanup plan
for the particular property.162 However, why would this request need to be
made since the DNR had already signed the letter of no objection, stating 
156. Pitre, Jr., supra note 79, at 109.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Brief for Appellants, supra note 109, at 6.
160. Id. at 7.
161. Id.
162. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 125, at 703.
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that it did not object to the terms of the settlement agreement—including 
the proposed remediation plan? This then begs the question, how could the 
DNR have approved the remediation plan if there was no estimation of
funds specified? The simple answer to both of these questions is this: in
practice, the DNR is not reviewing remediation plans attached to 
settlement agreements to determine if these plans are the most feasible for 
the court to adopt, because the DNR simply is not reviewing the details of
these plans at all. Even more unsettling is that this is the normal practice
in settlement agreements under Act 312, despite the DNR’s role explicitly
set forth in the statute.163 
As Act 312 mandates, the DNR shall have no less than 30 days to
review a proposed settlement agreement and comment to the court before
the settlement is certified.164 During these 30 days, the DNR is responsible
for reviewing the submitted environmental data, proposed remediation
plan, and estimation of funds to determine whether the parties have agreed
on the most feasible plan. This minimum 30-day period is largely
equivalent to the minimum 30-day period that begins under Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 30:29(C)(1) when a party admits liability, or is
found legally responsible by the court, and submits a plan to the DNR for
approval. Even in settlement agreements, the Louisiana Legislature 
intended that the DNR use this time to review the environmental data and
proposed remediation plans to ensure that the plan and estimation of funds
are sufficient to remediate the existing environmental damage. 
When granting the motion for approval in Britt, the district court stated:
The terms of the settlement are fairly explicit. I don’t think there’s 
any reference to money being put up, or there may be, but I think it 
was blacked out on my copy. I don’t remember funds specifically 
being mentioned, but the obligation to remediate was there on
behalf of Riceland and BP and I’m satisfied that the judgment I
originally signed in May would be appropriate judgment to execute
by the Court at this time.165 
As Britt exemplifies, the DNR’s actions in settlement agreements do not 
align with the legislative intent behind Act 312. Since the purpose of this 
30-day period is to allow the DNR time to determine what will be the most
feasible plan, any plan or submittal to the DNR within a settlement
agreement should also contain an estimation of implementation costs.166 
163. Brief for Appellants, supra note 109, at 8.
164. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(J)(1) (2006).
165. Brief for Appellants, supra note 109, at 10.
166. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(J)(1) (2006).
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5852020] COMMENT
Furthermore, the legislature specifically includes the possibility of a 
necessary contradictory hearing if the DNR, during its review, finds that 
additional remediation or funds are necessary than that for which the
settlement agreement accounts.167 If the DNR’s role in settlements was
merely to approve of the parties agreeing to settle, the legislature would 
not have included the possibility for a contradictory hearing, especially
since—as counsel for the defendants in Britt noted—parties agreeing to 
settle do not oppose the agreement’s terms.168 
V. THE SOLUTION: STICK TO THE PLAN
Because settlement negotiations occur during the proceedings, the
effect of parties engaging in a settlement agreement is largely analogous 
to a defendant conceding liability to remediate environmental damage.
Thus, when parties agree to settle, the remaining provisions of Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 30:29(C)(1) should apply:
If at any time during the proceeding . . . the finder of fact determines
that environmental damage exists and determines the party or
parties who caused the damage or who are otherwise legally
responsible therefore, the court shall order the party . . . whom the
court finds legally responsible for the damage to develop a plan or
submittal for the evaluation or remediation to applicable standards
of the contamination that resulted in the environmental damage.
The court shall order that the plan be developed and submitted to
the department and the court within a time that the court
determines is reasonable and shall allow the plaintiff or any other 
party at least thirty days from the date each plan or submittal was
made to the department and the court to review the plan or 
submittal and provide to the department and the court a plan,
comment, or input in response thereto.169 
The purpose of Act 312 is to prevent plaintiffs from having the ability to
claim and receive damages that exceed both the value of the property as well
as the damage, and furthermore to ensure that the damage award is used to
remediate the land.170 When considering this motivation for enacting and
later amending Act 312, the legislature likely intended the provisions to
apply regardless of whether parties go to trial or settle their environmental
167. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(J)(1) (2006).
168. Brief for Defendant-Appellees, supra note 121, at 8.
169. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(C)(1) (2006).
170. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(G) (2006).
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  232 5/21/20  8:23 AM





   
  
     
     
 
      
    
    
   
 
    
    
    
    
   
  
     
    
    
 
    
    
   
 
  







   
   
 
 
    
586 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
damage claims outside of court. The process of litigating environmental
damages claims can take many years, meaning that both sides risk incurring
excessive court costs and attorneys’ fees in addition to potentially having to
pay a substantial damage award. Not only are a significant amount of these
costs avoided when parties agree to settle outside of court, but settlement
agreements also expedite the remediation process, helping achieve the 
ultimate goal of restoring the environment to a standard that protects the
health, welfare, and safety of the public more quickly.
In settlement agreements, the court’s duty to determine liability is already
taken care of; the parties agree that environmental damage exists, and the
defendant agrees to remediate the land back to the applicable state regulatory
standards. However, this cooperation does not dispose of the DNR’s
responsibility to review the environmental data submitted, determine whether
remediation is necessary, and to review the remediation plan proposed in a
settlement agreement to determine if it is the most feasible plan to achieve the
necessary remediation. If the DNR’s recommendation of what is the most
feasible plan for remediation aligns with the settlement agreement’s proposed 
plan, then the court should approve the settlement, adopt the remediation plan,
and require the portion of the settlement award intended for the remediation
to be deposited into the registry of the court.
CONCLUSION
In Louisiana, the legacy of the oil and gas industry is one of economic 
dependence, cultural survival, and costly environmental consequences.171 
Enacted for the purpose of ensuring that environmental damage to land is 
remediated to a regulatory standard, the procedural framework established
by Act 312 should apply regardless of whether parties litigate their claims
in the courtroom or agree to settle without going to trial. Specifically, Act
312 requires that upon finding a need for remediation, the court, along with
the DNR, shall determine the most feasible plan of remediation and require 
the deposit of funds necessary to implement this plan into the registry of 
the court. The court then retains jurisdiction and oversight of these funds 
and plan implementation through completion.
Since most legacy lawsuits end up settling outside of court, the
procedure found in Act 312 must also apply to settlement agreements;
otherwise, the procedure will be rendered meaningless. Without a
determination that remediation is necessary, a court cannot be sure if the 
procedure set forth in Act 312 even applies. Furthermore, if the court does 
not require settling defendants to deposit the funds necessary for
171. Theriot, supra note 14, at 462.
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remediation into the court’s registry, there is significant risk that land will 
remain damaged if a liable defendant goes bankrupt. Unfortunately,
Louisiana’s oil and gas industry will likely remain stagnant after the Third
Circuit’s most recent interpretation of Act 312 and the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s denial of writs in the case of Britt v. Riceland Petroleum Co. Even 
a decade later, Corbello’s legacy may continue to live on after all—despite
the Louisiana Legislature’s extensive efforts to end it. 
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